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Abstract. Critical infrastructure systems (CIS) are complex large-scale systems 
which in turn require highly sophisticated supervisory control systems to ensure 
that high performance can be achieved and maintained under adverse condi-
tions. The global CIS Real-Time Control (RTC) need of operating in adverse 
conditions involves, with a high probability, sensor and actuator malfunctions 
(faults). This problem calls for the use of an on-line Fault Detection and Isola-
tion (FDI) system able to detect such faults. This paper proposes a FDI mecha-
nism that extends the classical Boolean fault signature matrix concept taking 
into account several fault signal properties to isolate faults in CIS. To exempli-
fy the proposed FDI scheme in CIS, the Barcelona drinking water network is 
used as a case study. 
1   Introduction 
Critical infrastructure systems (CIS), such as water, gas or electrical networks, are 
complex large-scale systems which in turn require highly sophisticated supervisory 
control systems. CIS are geographically distributed and decentralized with a hierar-
chical structure. Each subsystem is composed of a large number of elements with 
time-varying behavior, exhibiting numerous operating modes and subject to changes 
due to external conditions (e.g., weather) and operational constraints. But, in order to 
take profit of these expensive infrastructures, it is also necessary to have a highly 
sophisticated real-time control (RTC) scheme which ensures that high performance 
can be achieved and maintained under adverse conditions (Schütze et al., 2004; 
Ocampo et al., 2008). The advantage of RTC applied to CIS has been demonstrated 
by an important number of researchers during the last decades. Comprehensive re-
views that include a discussion of some existing implementations are given by Schil-
ling et al. (1996), Schütze et al. (2004) and Ocampo et al. (2013), and cited references 
therein, while practical issues are discussed by Schütze et al. (2002), among other.  
The RTC scheme in CIS might be local or global. When local control is applied, 
regulation devices use only measurements taken at their specific locations. While this 
control structure is applicable in many simple cases, in large systems with a strongly 
interconnected and complex infrastructure of sensors and actuators, it may not be the 
most efficient alternative. Conversely, a global control strategy is suitable for large 
scale systems with slow and coupled multivariable dynamic response such as water 
networks, which computes control actions taking into account real-time measure-
ments all through the network, is likely the best way to use the infrastructure capacity 
and all the available sensor information.  
 
The global RTC need of operating in adverse conditions involves, with a high 
probability, sensor and actuator malfunctions (faults) since due to the large scale 
nature of the systems, an important number of components are involved. This prob-
lem calls for the use of an on-line fault detection and isolation (FDI) system able to 
detect locally such faults, and correct them (if possible) by activating fault tolerant 
control (FTC) mechanisms. FTC techniques prevent the global RTC system from 
stopping every time a fault occurs by using techniques such as virtual sen-
sors/actuators or retuning of the controller, 
 
The FDI process aims at carefully identifying which fault (including hardware or 
software faults, and malicious attacks) can be hypothesized to be the cause of some 
monitored events. In general, when addressing the FDI problem, two approaches can 
be found in the literature: hardware redundancy based on the use of redundancies 
(adding extra sensors and actuators), and software (or analytical) redundancy based 
on the use of software/intelligent sensors (or model) combining information provided 
by sensor measurements or using other actuators to compensate a faulty actuator. In 
CIS, hardware redundancy is preferred. However, for large-scale systems, the use of 
hardware redundancy is very expensive and increases the number of maintenance and 
calibration operations. This is the reason why, in CIS applications, systems that allow 
combining both hardware and analytical redundancy (Carrozza, 2008) must be devel-
oped.   
 
This paper proposes a FDI mechanism that extends the classical Boolean fault 
signature matrix (FSM) concept taking into account several fault signal properties to 
isolate faults in CIS. To exemplify the proposed FDI scheme in CIS, the Barcelona 
drinking water network is used as a case study. 
2  Proposed Methodology 
2.1   Foundations 
The proposed FDI procedure is based on checking the consistency between the ob-
served and the normal system behavior using a set of analytical redundancy relations, 
which relate the values for measured variables according to a normal operation (fault-
free) model of the monitored system. When some inconsistency is detected, the fault 
isolation mechanism is activated in order to identify the possible fault.  
 
The design of a model-based FDI system is based on utilizing the CIS mathematical 
model (that is obtained from the constitutive elements and their basic relationships) to build 
a set of consistency tests that only involve observed variables, known as Analytical Redun-
dancy Relations (ARRs). A convenient description of the mathematical model of a CIS 
regarding FDI is by means of the following discrete-time model: 
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where: xnx  is the vector of system states, unu  is the vector of control actions and 
yny  is the  vector of system outputs; nk    is a vector of uncertain parameters;  
wn
kw  and nk    are unmodelled dynamics and disturbances and ; vnkv   are 
measurement noises; : x xn ng   and : yx nnh   are the state-space and measure-
ment nonlinear functions, respectively; and f is the nonlinear static relation function. 
 
 To obtain ARRs for state space representation such as (1), it is necessary to manipulate 
the model to eliminate unobserved variables (i.e., the state x).  
 
As it has been defined in Cordier et al. (2004), an ARR is a constraint derived from the 
system model which contains only observed variables, and which can therefore be evaluat-
ed from any observation obtained from measurements provided by the installed sensors. 
The evaluation of an ARR is denoted as r and is called the residual of the ARR. In ideal 
conditions (no uncertainty and no noise), r=0 in a non-faulty situation, while r≠0 otherwise. 
Thus, residual r is the basis for fault detection. 
 
Given the model defined in (1) with observed variables yk and uk, consistency tests can 
be derived from an ARR by generating a computational residual in the following way: 
   0,  kkii uyr      (2) 
 
where i is called the residual ARR expression. The set of ARR can be represented as 
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where nr is the number of obtained ARRs. 
 
In CIS, these ARRs can be efficiently derived applying structural analysis tech-
niques. The analysis of the model structure has been widely used in the area of mod-
el-based diagnosis (Blanke et al., 2006). A structural model of a system is an abstrac-
tion of the analytical model where only the relation between variables and equations 
is taken into account, neglecting the mathematical expression of this relation. The 
diagnosis analysis based on structural models is performed by means of graph-based 
methods which have no numerical problems and are more efficient, in general, than 
analytical methods. In (Sarrate et al., 2014), a structural model of a water distribution 
network is obtained for FDI system design. See (Rosich et al., 2012) and (Travé-
Massuyés et al, 2006) for a comprenhensive description of ARR design methodolo-
gies based on structural analysis. 
  
 
 
2.2 Fault Detection 
 
In the literature, there are different approaches to solve this problem. For example, 
statistical decision methods (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993) can be used when un-
known dynamics and measurement noise are stochastically modeled. In many practi-
cal situations, this assumption is not realistic, being more natural to assume that dis-
turbances/model errors and measurement noise are bounded and their effect is propa-
gated to the residuals using, for example, interval methods (Puig et al., 2008). Taking 
into account bounded uncertainties, the residual of the ARR (2) is monitored by eval-
uating an interval: 
 
  , , ,i i i i k k k kr r r y u D           (5) 
 
where D is the interval box  nD        , that includes all the bounded 
uncertainties. Fault detection is formulated as ARR consistency checking using a set-
membership approach (Tornil-Sin et al., 2012). 
 
Given a system described by (3) and a sequence of measured inputs ku and outputs 
ky  of the real system at time k, an ARR is consistent with those measurements and 
the known bounds of uncertain parameters and noise if there exists a set of sequences 
Dk which satisfies the ARR. 
 
Given a sequence of observed inputs ku and outputs ky  of the real system,  a fault 
is said to be detected at time k if there does not exist a set of sequences Dk  to 
which the set of ARRs is consistent.  
 
Based on interval reasoning, a fault is detected when  i0 r where  ir is defined in 
(5) . The information provided by the consistency checking is stored as fault signal  ki  
: 
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From computation point of view (6) are generated as ˆ( ) ( ) ( , )r k y k y k   , where 
ˆ( , )y k  is the estimated value of the output obtained from (1), using for example pari-
ty equations or observers. 
 
2.3 Fault isolation 
 
While a single residual is sufficient to detect faults, a set (or a vector) of residuals 
is required for fault isolation (Gertler, 1998). Once the jth residual has been generated, 
it is evaluated in order to detect normal or abnormal behaviors. In general, a fault f 
affects a subset of ARRs, fR  .   
 
In model based FDI, the fault effects on the residual can be expressed in terms of 
the residual fault sensitivity that leads to the residual internal form (Gertler, 1998). 
For example, in the case of residual r1 is affected by faults f1 and f2, the internal form 
can be expressed as follows 
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where,  1 1fS q  and  2 1fS q are the residual fault sensitivity transfer functions that 
characterize the fault effect on the residual and q-1 is the delay operator of discrete 
time models. 
 
The fault isolation module proposed in this paper is a generalization to a CIS of the 
one used in Puig et al. (2005) (see Figure 1). The first component is a memory that 
stores information on the fault signal occurrence history and it is cyclically updated by 
the fault detection module. The pattern comparison component compares the memory 
contents with the stored fault patterns. The classical Boolean fault signature matrix 
concept (Gertler, 1998) is generalized by extending the binary interface to take into 
account more fault signal properties. The last component represents the decision logic 
part of the method whose aim is to propose the most probable fault candidate. 
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Figure 1. Fault detection and isolation logic scheme. 
 
 
2.3.1Memory component 
 
The memory component consists of a table in which events in the residual history 
are stored. When 1i  , the occurrence time, identified by ko, is stored in the first 
column; the maximum nominal residual ,maxir  is stored in the second column and 
computes as follow: 
   ,max ,max ( )o o w oi ik k k Tr r k                                (9) 
 
where oir is computed according to (5) considering the center of the uncertainty inter-
val o ; and, the sign of the residual is stored in the last column. If the fault detection 
component detects a new fault signal, the memory is updated by filling out all those 
fields. The problem of different time instant appearances of the fault signal  ki  is 
solved by disabling the isolation decision until a prefixed waiting time Tw has elapsed 
from the first fault signal appearance. This Tw is calculated from the larger transient 
time response from a non-faulty situation to any faulty situation. After this time has 
elapsed, a diagnosis is proposed and the memory component is reset in order to be 
ready to start the diagnosis of a new fault. Following the approach of Combastel et al. 
(2003), inside this diagnosis time window, the maximum activation value of the 
memory-table ,maxir at time k0 and for one residual i changes only if the current nomi-
nal residual is superior to the previous ones. Due to the max-operator activation val-
ues can only rise. Using this strategy the effect of noise and non-persistence fault 
indicators are filtered because just the activation peaks are stored. The memory table 
makes the residual history accessible for later computation by explicitly storing that 
data. In this way, temporal aspects of fault isolation can be handled in a very easy and 
straightforward way. 
 
2.3.2 Pattern comparison component 
 
The pattern comparison component compares the memory contents with the stored 
fault patterns. Fault patterns are organized according to a theoretical FSM. This inter-
pretation assumes that the occurrence of fj is observable in ir , hypothesis known as 
fault exoneration or no compensation, and that fj is the only fault affecting the moni-
tored system. Five different fault signature matrices are considered in the evaluation 
task: Boolean fault signal activation (FSM01), fault signal signs (FSMsign), fault 
residual sensitivity (FSMsensit), and, finally, fault signal occurrence order 
(FSMorder) and time after the first residual is activated  (FSMtime). Theses matrices 
can be obtained from the analysis of residual fault sensitivity (8). Details on the gen-
eral rules to obtain those matrices from (8) can be found in Meseguer et al. (2010).  
  
 
2.3.3 Decision logic component 
 
The decision logic algorithm starts when the first residual is activated (that is, 
1i  ) and lasts Tw time instants or till all fault hypotheses except one are rejected 
because they do not fulfill the observed residual activation order/time or because an 
unexpected activation signal has been observed according to those fault hypotheses. 
Rejection is based on using the results of factor01j, factorsignj and factororderj. If 
any of these factors is ’zero’ for a given fault hypothesis, it will be rejected. Every 
factor, with a range of [0,1], represents some kind of a filter, suggesting a set of pos-
sible fault hypotheses. At the end of the time window Tw, for each non-rejected fault 
hypothesis, a fault isolation indicator is calculated using factorsensitj and factortimej 
factors. Thus, the biggest fault isolation indicator will determine the diagnosed fault. 
The fault isolation indicator associated to the fault hypothesis fj is determined as it 
follows: 
 
max( , )j j jd sensit time factor factor                                     (10) 
           
So, the final diagnosis result can be expressed as a set of fault candidates with their 
associated fault isolation indicator. 
3   Application to the Barcelona Water Transport Network 
3.1 Description of network 
 
The Barcelona water network supplies water to approximately 3 million consum-
ers, distributed in 23 municipalities in a 424 km2 area. Water can be taken from both 
surface and underground sources. The most important ones in terms of capacity and 
use are Ter, which is a surface source, and Llobregat, where water can be taken from 
one surface source and one underground source. Water is supplied from these sources 
to 218 demand sectors through around 4645 km of pipes. The complete transport 
network has been modeled using: 63 storage tanks, 3 surface sources and 7 under-
ground sources, 79 pumps, 50 valves, 18 nodes and 88 demands. The network is con-
trolled through a SCADA system (Figure 2) with sampling periods of 1 hour.  For the 
predictive control scheme a prediction horizon of 24 h is chosen. This record is updat-
ed at each time interval. 
 
 
Figure 2. Barcelona water transport network description 
 
 
3.2 FDI in the Barcelona water network 
 
The case study used to illustrate the FDI methodology proposed in this paper is 
based on part of this network. It includes two subsystems, known as Orioles and Cer-
vello. This part of the network includes the following elements: 
- Tanks: d150SBO, d175LOR, d147SCC, d205CES, d263CES 
- Actuators with sensor flows: iStBoi, iOrioles, iStaClmCervello, iCesalpina1 
- Demands with sensor flows: c157SBO, c175LOR, c147SCC, c205CES, 
c263CES 
- Sensor levels: d150SBO, xd175LOR, xd147SCC, xd205CES, xd263CES 
 
This case study can be modeled by the system described by (1), with a 5-
dimentional state space vector where each ix is the i
th tank level, ,in iq  and ,out iq  are 
the input and output tank flows, and di is the demand. The set of known variables is  ,i ju y for i=1,..,5 and j=1,..,15, where ui are the actuator command variables 
and yj concerns all measured variables , including the sensors described above.  
Applying the algorithm proposed by (Travé-Massuyés et al, 2006), 21 ARRs have 
been obtained. From these ARRs, the same number of residuals can be generated. Consid-
ering faults in the actuators, fPi, flow transducers, fFi,  level transducers, fLi, and de-
mand transducers fdi, for i=1,…,5, the fault signature matrix shown in Figure 3 is 
obtained. This fault signature matrix includes binary and sign information. 
 
Figure 3. Theoretical fault signature matrix FSM using binary and sign information 
 
If just binary information is considered, all faults are detectable, but only fPi and fFi 
are isolable. For instance, faults {fLi, fdi} can not be isolated because both can not 
observed independently. But if sign information is taken into account, both can be 
distinguished. Moreover, notice that the information provided by both sensors, {fLi, 
fdi} is essential for computing residuals because there is not enough redundancy, Thus, 
they can be considered as critical sensors. A fault in one of these sensors modifies the 
ARR sets, resulting to an undetectable fault. The fault detection and isolation proce-
dure described in Section 2 has been applied in a simulation case. Figure 4 shows the 
first 8 ARR residuals and fault signal evolution when a drift in sensor iOrioles flow, 
fF2, is introduced at hour 362. Notice that residuals r2, r4, r7 and r8 are non-consistent, 
indicating as potential fault {fP2, fF1, fF2, fL1, fL2, fd1, fd2}. 
  
 
 
 
The time evolution of factor01 and factorsign are plotted at every time instant in 
Figure 5. It can be seen that both factors indicate as a maximum fault hypothesis fP2, 
with dP2 = 1 (10), There are also others activated factors but with a smaller indication 
magnitude. In this example, the time needed for detection and isolation is of two sam-
pling times. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Fault signal analysis based on (a) factor01 and (b) factorsign. 
 
Figure 4. (a) Residuals and (b) fault signal evolution with a drift fault in sensor
iOrioles flow. 
4   Conclusions 
CIS are complex large-scale systems which in turn require highly sophisticated su-
pervisory-control systems to ensure that high performance can be achieved and main-
tained under adverse conditions. The global RTC need of operating in adverse condi-
tions involve, with a high probability, sensor and actuator malfunctions (faults). This 
problem calls for the use of an on-line FDI system able to detect such faults and cor-
rect them (if possible) by activating fault tolerant mechanisms. The proposed FDI 
mechanism extends the classical Boolean fault signature matrix concept taking into 
account several fault signal properties to isolate the faults in CIS. To exemplify the 
FDI methodologies in CIS, the Barcelona drinking water network is used as the case 
study. 
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